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THE PASSAGE OF TITLE
The Uniform Commercial Code does away with the concept of title
by substituting a narrow issue approach to the specific problems over
which litigation arises. It may readily be said that courts have settled
most sales litigation by determining who holds title to the goods. This
is true under the Common Law, and also true under the Uniform Sales
Act.' The party holding title to goods is treated as the "real party in
interest" for a great many purposes. He has the risk of loss, an insurable
interest, and the right to sue third party tortfeasors.
As a general rule, under both the Common Law and the Uniform
Sales Act, the time at which title passes between seller and buyer depends
upon the intention of the parties. Uniform Sales Act Section 19 provides
us with a series of rules of construction to determine the intent of the
parties as to the time at which title to goods is to pass to the buyer, and is
to be applied only when such an intent cannot be found from the contract.
When no intent can be so found, the facts, as determined from the evidence,
are applied to USA 19 to determine which of the rules are applicable.
The problem of finding the intention of the parties is extremely
difficult, and has left us with a mass of confusing and conflicting cases.
One example of confusion in interpreting the Uniform Sales Act with
regard to intention of the parties and its role in fixing title in goods,
and therefore risk of loss, is shown by applying USA 19 (1) (2).2
A 1943 Minnesota case, Radloff v. Bragmuss illustrates the problem.
On November 9th a farmer agreed to sell his entire flock of turkeys to a
produce company, delivery to be made on November 13th, price to be
determined on grade, weight, and sex of the birds, with these matters being
determined on November 13th. The entire flock was destroyed in a blizzard
on November 11th. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the produce company had the risk of loss in as much as title passed on November
,9th at the time of making the contract. The weighing, counting, and
grading-of the birds were considered to be routine matters of computation.
So, Uniform Sales Act Section 19 (1) was applied.
What the court seems to hold is that this was an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, which were in a deliverable state at the time
the contract was made so that title passed immediately upon making the
1.
2.

3.

Adopted by Wyoming and appears in Chapter 41, Wyoming Compiled Statutes
(1945).
USA 19:
1) Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the
contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the
time of delivery or both be postponed.
2) Where there is a contract to sell specific goods and the seller is bound to do
something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable
state, the property does not pass until such thing be done.
214 Minn. 130, 7 N.W.2d 491 (1943).
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contract. Hence under the Uniform Sales Act the passage of title to the
produce company placed the risk of loss on the company, under a presumption set up by Section 19 (1) that it was the "intention of the parties."
The court had to determine several issues of fact in this case in order
to decide whether or not Section 19 (1) applied. The first issue for
determination was whether these goods were specific and ascertained. The
court concluded that in as much as this was a contract for the farmer's
entire flock, the goods were specific, ascertained, and in a deliverable
state.
Section 19(1) is specific on the point that it is immaterial after the
contract is made "whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery,
or both be postponed." However, it is necessary in order to place the
transaction within this section that nothing remains for the seller to do
to the goods for purposes of putting them in a deliverable state. The
question may then be asked if the provision of the contract which stipulated
that the turkeys would be weighed, counted, and graded on November
13th was something which remained to be done. The court held that this
was a matter of simple computation and that the birds, despite the fact
that most of them were dead and frozen, could be still be counted, weighed,
and graded.
Since weighing, counting, and grading the birds did not amount to
"something remaining to be done" in the view of the court, the case did not
come within Section 19 (2) .4 Had it been possible to activate this section,
the result in the case would have been opposite. If the court had interpreted the weighing, counting, and grading as "something to be done,"
title would not have passed with the making of the bargain because the
presumption under Section 19 (2) is that the seller's performance is not
complete. If the performance is not complete, the parties to the contract
did not contemplate that title should pass. So, the risk of loss would
remain with the seller.
Professor Hawkland 5 suggests that the result in the case would have
been different had the birds been totally destroyed. He says, "of course
the court was able to fix the price because the birds were available (albeit
dead and frozen) for counting, weighing, and grading. But suppose the
birds had been consumed by a forest fire. And, it is interesting to note,
that in some cases, in which the goods have been destroyed by fire so that
the price cannot by weighing, counting, grading, etc., be determined, the
courts have held that these matters were not 'routine' but went to the
heart of the contract, i.e., the price, and hence consituted 'something
4.

5.

Ibid. "There was nothing further for plaintiff to do 'for the purpose of putting
them (the turkeys) into deliverable state.' The counting, weighing, and grading
of the turkeys were purely matters of routine and of simple computation, as much
so as if so many steers had been involved to be paid for at so much per pound."

Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales (Under the Uniform Commercial Code), p. 81
(July, 1955).
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remaining to be done' for the purposes of activating Section 19 (2)
preventing title from passing with the bargain."

and

If the problem in a case is one of risk of loss, it would seem that
consistent decisions in similar cases should be made. The great amount
of title passage uncertainty which prevails in the Law of Sales could, upon
some reflection, lead to the conclusion that the concept of "title" is a fiction
which needs to be removed.
The Uniform Commercial Code, by placing much less stress on title,
removes a great deal of doubt and inconsistency. Indeed, the lawyer's
first consideration need not be an attempt to locate title in the goods,
but to address himself to a basic, narrow consideration of the problem
itself-risk of loss, insurable interest, right to sue third patries for injury
to goods. The Code, by setting out specific provisions, renders the broad
concept of title relatively useless. In fact, the lawyer in a state which has
adopted the Code will refer to "title" only if the Code fails to provide
him with a specific provision. Only to this extent would the concept of
"title" remain important.
The Code in Sections 2-509 and 2-510 specifically deals with the
problem of risk of loss in terms of the contract itself, rather than having
to rely upon passage of title. We have seen that, as a result of the operation
of presumptions of title, under the Uniform Sales Act the main issue of
risk of loss, although it is provided for,8 is obscured by the fiction that the
loss shall fall upon the party that holds title. We must determine who has
title by referring back to USA 19, supra, and the "intention of the parties"
test. The underlying theory of the Code sections on risk of loss is the
adoption of the contractual approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of
the risk with "title" in the goods.7 UCC 2-509 deals with risk of loss in
absence of breach by the seller, while UCC 2-510 deals with risk of loss
only where there has been a breach by either the seller or the buyer. Had
the Radloff case been decided under the Code, the court could have proceeded immediately to the issue of risk of loss and applied the simple
test of whether there had been a breach by the seller. As the seller had
committed no breach, the court would have applied UCC 2-509. The
opposite result would have been reached, since under this section the
risk of loss would have passed to the buyer only upon his receipt of the
goods.8
There need be no mention of title; these rules apply irrespective of
title.9 In the Radloff case UCC 2-401 (3) (b) would have allowed the
court .to find that title to the turkeys had passed, 10 but that iFisk of loss
remained with the seller," despite the passage of title.
6.
7.
8.
9.

USA 22.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-509, Comment (1).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-509 (3).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-101 Comment.

10.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401 (3) (b).

11.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-509 (3).
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Generally, at Common Law and under the Uniform Sales Act a buyer
did not have an insurable interest in the goods until title passed to him.
All of the title passage uncertainty which was existent in the Radloff
case relating to risk of loss applies to a determination of title as a condition
precedent to the buyer having an insurable interest. Under the Code the
problem of insurable interest is also dealt with narrowly and explicitly.
The Code speaks in terms of "special property" and "identification" as the
test of an insurable interest.': This test indicates that a contracting buyer
may have an insurable interest irrespective of passage of title.
UCC 2-501 (1) indicates that the buyer obtains a special property
and an insurable interest by an identification of existing goods as goods
to which the contract refers, even though the goods so identified are nonconforming and the buyer has the option to return or reject them.
Obviously, identification can be made in any manner explicitly agreed to
by the parties. This is no change from existing law. But, the Code
applies in absence of express agreement and removes the uncertainty
which now exists because of the necessity of finding "title." 1 3
For example, taking the Radlof case again, assume that the produce
company had desired to insure the turkeys against a loss such as it had
to bear. Under the Uniform Sales Act the parties would have had to
stipulate that title to the birds was to pass at the making of the contract
in order to give the produce company a well defined insurable interest.
But, under the Code, in absence of express agreement, the narrow issue
approach would have allowed the produce company to insure by operation
of statute if the goods were already existing and identified, 14 as the
Minnesota Court, subsequent to the loss, found they were. We might
then draw the conclusion that had the uncertainty of the title concept not
entered the picture, the produce company might have been saved the loss
by covering this transaction, and for that matter all of their transactions
of this nature, with insurance.
The seller is equally well protected under the Code. UCC 2-501 (2)
retains for the seller an insurable interest so long as title to, or any
security interest in, the goods remains in him. The Code here incorporates
the title concept of the law of sales, but improves on it by adding the term
"security interest." A "security interest" is defined by the Code as "an
interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation."'15 Hence, under the Code, the farmer in the Radloff case would
have retained an insurable interest despite the fact that title had passed to
the buyer, because he had a security interest until payment.
Under the present law only the "real party in interest" has the right
12.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-501.

13.
14.
15.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-501 (1) (a) (b) (c).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-501 (4) (a).
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201.
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to sue third parties for injury to goods. The Code incorporates this view
but extends it. UCC 2-722 (a) provides that either party to the contract
for sale may sue "who has title to or a security interest or a special property
or an insurable interest in the goods." The seller has an exclusive right of
action prior to the "identification of existing goods as goods to which the
contract refers." The stated purpose of UCC 2-722 is to adopt the title
principle and then extend it to apply not only to suit by the "real party
in interest" but, through the activation of the "identification" theory,16
to either the seller or the buyer after "identification of existing goods as
goods to which the contract refers." Before acceptance and without revocation, the right to sue third parties may be in both the seller and the
buyer. Even after final acceptance of the goods by the buyer, the seller,
so long as he retains a security interest in the goods, 17 has a right of
action against third parties.
When the right of action is held by both parties, the Code stipulates
that where neither party to the contract has expressly agreed to bear
the risk of loss and the party plaintiff in the suit against the third party
did not bear the risk of loss as against the other party to the contract and
there is no arrangement between them for disposition of the recovery,
the plaintiff's suit or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary
for the other party to the contract.1 8
In the Radloff case then, had the turkeys been destroyed by the act of a
thir4 party, the right of action in absence of express agreement would have
been in either party. The turkeys had been "identified" to the contract,
indeed the Minnesota Supreme Court found that title had passed; therefore, the buyer had an insurable interest in the birds and could have
maintained suit against the third party.' 9 Fhe seller also retained a right
of action by having a security interest in the flock until payment. 20 As a
result, the party who had the actual money loss would be protected and
compensated by specific operation of the Code without once referring to
2
the question of who had title. '
Thus, adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code would remove from
the law of sales a concept which has caused a great deal of confusion,
wasted effort, and uncertainty. Under the sales law presently in effect in
Wyoming and most other states the concept of title has bbscured the
narrow issues of risk of loss, insurable interest, the right to sue third parties
for injury to goods, and the other rights and obligations of the seller and
buyer under a cloud of fictional presumptions which are said to reflect
the intention of the parties. The main issue of the lawsuit becomes almost
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-501 (1).
Supra note 15.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-722 (b).
Supra note 18.
Supra note 15.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-722.
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secondary to the quest for finding the "real party in interest" to fix title.
The Code, by placing the title concept far in the background, streamlines
the law of sales by presenting the issues narrowly, thus allowing the lawyer
and the courts to deal with the specific issue in a given case without first
having to find title in the goods and then dealing with the narrow issue.
The fact that the rules set out in the Uniform Commercial Code apply
"irrespective of title" 22 should lead to consistent results in similar cases
and remove the presently existing uncertainty and inconsistency prevalent
in the elusive concept of title.
D. THOMAS KIDD

BULK SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Article 6 of the Uniform Commerical Code does not introduce any
strikingly new concepts or innovations. Rather, its major contribution is
its definitive character resulting in a clarification of the problems that
exist in the varied bulk sales acts which are now in effect in the various
states. In the absence of a bulk sales act of some type, a creditor of a
fraudulent transferor has no recourse against the bona fide purchaser who
has paid an adequate consideration for the property transferred. The
purpose of a bulk sales law is to protect the general creditors who, on the
faith of a stock of merchandise, extend credit to a merchant. Such a
merchant is in a position to commit a fraud upon his creditors by selling
his stock in trade and disappearing with the proceeds. The bulk sales
law protects the creditors by giving them notice before the intended transfer
takes place so that they may take whatever action is necessary to protect
their interests.
Wyoming, recognizing the desirability of protecting creditors of this
type, has by statute1 declared a transfer in bulk presumptively fraudulent
and therefore void against the transferor's creditors unless certain requirements are performed. The purchaser of an inventory in bulk has the
affirmative duty to ascertain the transferor's creditors and notify them of
the proposed sale at least five days before the sale. An inventory must
be compiled showing the quantity and the cost price to the seller at least
five days before the sale. 2 Failure to comply with the requirements
renders the transfer void as to the creditors of the transferor, 3 and upon
the application of any creditor of the seller, the transferee will become a
receiver of the complaining creditors and be held accountable to the
extent of the property he has acquired by virtue of the sale.4
22.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Supra note 9.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. §1 41-701 to 51-703 (1945), WS §§ 34-236 to 34-238.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 41-701 (1945), WS § 34-237.
Ibid.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 41-703 (1945), WS 5 34-238.

